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COMMENT

Resolving Ambiguity in the FCPA through
Compliance with the OECD Convention on
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
ERIC J. SMITH†

INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, the investigation into the Watergate scandal
exposed corruption at the highest level of government.1 Less well
known are the various corporate bribery schemes the investigations
uncovered, including the discovery by the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) of over $300 million in potential bribes to foreign
officials from over four hundred U.S. companies.2 Americans
responded by demanding greater corporate accountability, and
Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to
prevent and sanction American corruption in international business.3
Despite this new authority, deregulation remained the dominant
ideology of the time period, and the commercial world continued to
operate largely free of restrictions throughout the 1980s and 90s.4

†

Executive Notes Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2011–2012; J.D.,
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, May 2012. Thank you to
Professors Michael Van Alstine and Peter G. Danchin and all the editors of the Maryland
Journal of International Law for their invaluable assistance with this article.
1. H. Lowell Brown, Avoiding Bribery When Doing Business Overseas: A Primer on
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 20 ME. BAR J. 78, 78 (2002). See also Melysa Sperber,
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 679 n.2 (2002) (―Congress passed
the FCPA to restore public confidence in the business community after a series of bribery
scandals tarnished corporate America‘s image at home and abroad.‖).
2. Fraud Section, Crim. Div., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Antibribery
Provisions
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-personsguide.pdf [hereinafter FCPA Guide].
3. Sperber, supra note 1, at 679 n. 2.
4. See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 89 (2010) (―Despite the scandals and crises that marked
the 1990s . . . Wall Street translated its growing economic power into political power and . . .
the ideology of . . . deregulation became conventional wisdom in Washington on both sides
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Recently, however, the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the SEC have cracked down and steadily increased both
the number of investigations and the penalties sought under the
FCPA.5 In fact, prosecution of FCPA violations has increased
exponentially every year since 2005.6 In 2010, half of the two billion
dollars in judgments and settlements secured by the DOJ‘s Criminal
Division came from FCPA enforcement.7 Furthermore, whereas they
formerly targeted primarily business entities, recent FCPA
prosecutions have implicated more individuals than ever before,
including many corporate officers and directors.8 Prosecutors hope
this pursuit of individual employees will act as a significant deterrent
to bribery, as the corporate form ―cannot provide a safe haven‖ for
the officers, even following the resolution of an action against the
company itself.9
While many companies have responded to the growth in FCPA
prosecutions by creating expanded compliance programs, 10 the
continually expanding reach of private enterprise leaves many
violators beyond the reach of U.S. enforcement authorities.11
Furthermore, payments to foreign officials remain a part of the

of the political aisle.‖). See also id. (describing the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994
and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 as ―only confirmed trends that had begun in the
1970s, and signified that the federal government would no longer attempt to resist the desires
of,‖ industry).
5. Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS.
LAW. 1243, 1247 (2008).
6. See id. at 1247 (noting the increase in FCPA activity from thirty-five prosecutions
and seventeen investigations in 2005 to sixty-seven prosecutions and sixty investigations in
2007). See also Don Lee, Doing Sticky Business in China; A Pasadena Firm Gets Caught up
in a Market Rife with Corruption, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at A1. (―Currently, at least 91
cases are open, triple the number four years ago . . . .‖).
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Department of Justice Secures More Than $2
Billion in Judgments and Settlements as a Result of Enforcement Actions Led by the
Criminal Division (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/
11-crm-085.html.
8. Jeffrey Clark et al., Anti-Corruption, 44 INT‘L LAW., 451, 451 (2010).
9. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4 (2010)
(statement of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Attorney General).
10. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 1272 (―Many companies, especially U.S.-based
companies, have responded to heightened FCPA enforcement by installing comprehensive
anti-corruption compliance programs.‖).
11. See, e.g., Colleen A. Conry, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act in the
Global Healthcare Industry, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 9–11 (2010) (describing the
global reach of the pharmaceutical industry and the attendant FCPA implications).
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commercial landscape in emerging markets around the world.12
Fortunately, many nations are now subject to the same prohibitions as
U.S. businesses,13 yet ambiguities in the FCPA and its vigorous
application by domestic enforcement authorities still disadvantage
American commercial interests by subjecting them to prohibitions
that do not apply to companies in much of the world.14
In the competition-driven private sector, the United States has
historically demanded a level playing field.15 Perhaps in response to
such demands, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) drafted the Convention on Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions
(Convention).16 Despite the existence of the Convention, a lack of
parity between the Convention and the FCPA remains due to
vigorous U.S. enforcement of the FCPA. By aligning enforcement of
the FCPA with the international standards in the Convention, the U.S.
could achieve the parity desired in the business world. Furthermore,
shifting the focus on corporate ethics to the international framework
already in place would provide the comprehensive approach to
bribery prevention that enforcement authorities demand. Moreover,
by following the prohibitions of the Convention, the United States
could act as a model for other nations and remain a leader in
international commerce and the prevention of bribery.
This comment will show how international law and the
ratification of the Convention require the SEC and the DOJ to align
their interpretation of the FCPA with the Convention. Part II begins
with a review of the statutory language of the FCPA. 17 After
introducing the FCPA, Part II also explores the most significant areas
12. See, e.g., Mary Anastasia O‘Grady, Democrats and Haiti Telecom, WALL ST J., Mar.
15, 2010, at A21 (describing Haiti as ―pure pay to play‖).
13. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105–43, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at
http://ww.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf [hereinafter OECD Convention].
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 1 at 30–35 (narrating the historical attempts to
limit concentrated financial power).
16. See OECD Convention, supra note 16, pmbl. (―Recognising that achieving
equivalence among the measures to be taken by the Parties is an essential object and purpose
of the Convention . . . .‖). In fact, a number of multinational conventions exist, see infra note
102, but this paper will focus on the OECD Convention on account of its effectiveness,
particularly in the creation and enforcement of implementing legislation in member states.
See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2012).
17. See infra Part II.A.
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of ambiguity in the statute.18 Part II.B reviews the language of the
Convention and the implementing legislation of a few of the
Convention‘s significant parties.19 Finally, Part III.A notes where the
FCPA and the Convention differ,20 and Part III.B explains why the
applicable law requires an interpretation of the FCPA that fits more
closely with the Convention.21 This alignment with international law
would clarify certain elements of the FCPA for courts, business
entities, and individuals, and achieve the desired parity in
international business.
I.

THE TEXT OF THE FCPA AND THE CONVENTION

A.

The FCPA

The FCPA prohibits payments to foreign officials by U.S.
businesses and individuals for the purposes of:
(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign
official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign
official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful
duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper
advantage . . . in order to assist the company in obtaining or
retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any
person.22
The FCPA prohibits the making of such payments by ―issuers,‖23
―domestic concerns,‖24 and since 1998,25 ―any person.‖26 A
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006). The FCPA specifically prohibits payments by ―any
issuer which has a class of securities registered‖ in the United States or ―which is required to
file reports,‖ or ―for any officer, director, employee, or agent‖ of the company acting on its
behalf ―to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of
anything of value to‖ (1) a ―foreign official,‖ (2) ―foreign political party or official thereof,
or any candidate,‖ or (3) ―any person, while knowing‖ it might end up in the hands of a
foreign official, political party, or candidate. Id. § 78dd-1(a)(1)–(3).
23. Id. § 78dd-1(a). An issuer is any company that has securities registered with the SEC
under § 12 of the 1934 Exchange Act or that is required to file reports under §15(d) of that
act. Id. The FCPA also contains ―accounting provisions,‖ which apply only to issuers.
Sperber, supra note 1, at 683. These provisions require companies ―to keep accurate books
and records in order to fairly report the transactions of the corporation,‖ in order to prevent
concealment of bribery through creative accounting practices. Id. at 683 & n. 15.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). The FCPA defines a domestic concern as:
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prohibited payment may consist of ―any money, or offer, gift,
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of
value.‖27 The violator must also have acted corruptly and made the
payment in order to obtain or retain business. Additionally, one
violates the FCPA if he gives anything of value to a third party with
knowledge that it will be ―offered, given, or promised‖ to a foreign
official to obtain or retain business.28
The FCPA, therefore, has five elements for criminal liability:
(1) An issuer, domestic concern, or any other person,
makes;
(2) an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization
of the payment of any money, or offer, gift,
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of
anything of value;
(3) to a foreign official, political party, or candidate;
(4) corruptly;
(5) in order to assist such (issuer, domestic concern, or
person) in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person.29

(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States;
and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the
laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth
of the United States. Id. § 78dd-2(h).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). The expansion of liability under the FCPA to ―any person‖ in
1998 occurred in a Congressional amendment to implement U.S. obligations under the
OECD Convention. Sperber, supra note 10, at 680. Article 1 of the OECD Convention
requires that ―[e]ach party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is
a criminal offense under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any
undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign
public official. OECD Convention, supra note 14, art. 1.
26. The FCPA also proscribes payments by ―any officer, director, employee, or agents of
such issuer or any stockholder acting on behalf of‖ an issuer, domestic concern, or person.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). The Fifth Circuit has held that an employee may not be convicted
under the FCPA if his employer ―has not and cannot‖ be convicted under that act. United
States v. McLean, 738 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1984). The court in McLean discusses the
Eckhardt Amendment, which was added to Title 15 out of concern for the potential that
corporations might use their employees as scapegoats, as well as to provide employees ―the
benefit of the superior resources of the corporation in presenting a defense in a criminal
proceeding.‖ Id. at 658–59. For the text of the Eckhardt Amendment see 15 U.S.C. §§
78ff(c)(3), 78dd-2(b)(1)(B)(3).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
28. Id. § 78dd-1(a)(3).
29. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a) to -3(a).
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Subsection (f) of the FCPA defines some of the statute‘s material
terms. First, it defines a ―foreign official‖ as ―any officer or employee
of a foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality
thereof, or of a public international organization,‖ or anyone ―acting
in an official capacity‖ for one of those same bodies.30 Second, the
statute defines knowledge as awareness or ―a firm belief.‖ Therefore,
the statutory knowledge requirement for third party payments is
satisfied when one has ―a firm belief‖ that the third party will give
the money to a foreign official.31
The statute provides a few ways to avoid liability. First, the
FCPA contains an exception for payments to facilitate or expedite
standard governmental procedures,32 often referred to as ―grease‖
payments.33 Second, an FCPA defendant may have an affirmative
defense if the bribe was lawful under the written laws and regulations
of the foreign official‘s country.34 Third, a defendant may also have
an affirmative defense if the payment was a ―reasonable and bona
fide‖ expenditure directly related to a product demonstration or the
performance of a contract.35
Jurisdiction under the FCPA occurs under both the territorial and
nationality principles.36 Together, these quintessential jurisdictional
principles allow a state to regulate any conduct occurring within its
territory or having a significant effect therein (territorial), as well as
any conduct by its nationals occurring anywhere in the world

30. Id. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
31. Id. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). Compare this standard with the knowledge standard
from American criminal law, where one acts ―knowingly if he is aware that that result is
practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.‖
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-1(f)(3).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3). Permissible ―grease‖ payments to foreign officials include
those made for the purpose of:
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to
do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental papers, such as
visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and
delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or
inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone
service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting
perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a
similar nature. Id. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(i)–(v).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1).
35. Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2).
36. FCPA Guide, supra note 2, at 3.
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(nationality).37 In other words, jurisdiction under the FCPA exists
over non-nationals only if their actions connect them territorially with
interstate commerce.38 However, through the nationality principle,
jurisdiction exists over bribes by ―United States person[s]‖ without
any linkage to interstate commerce.39 Therefore, foreign corporations
and foreign nationals may only be liable under the FCPA if they use
the mails or another instrumentality of interstate commerce to make a
bribe, but U.S. nationals may be held liable for any bribe to a foreign
official.
Enforcement of the FCPA is done by both the SEC and the
DOJ.40 The SEC handles civil enforcement of violations by issuers,
while the DOJ handles civil enforcement of violations by domestic
concerns and foreign companies, as well as all criminal enforcement
of FCPA violations.41 Both agencies have significantly increased the
number of FCPA prosecutions over the past five years,42 prioritizing
FCPA enforcement as ―second only to fighting terrorism.‖43
Additionally, a few courts have allowed private individuals to bring
FCPA claims under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.44
In addition to the investigation and prosecution of FCPA
violations, the DOJ monitors FCPA compliance through the FCPA
Opinion Procedure. Created as part of the 1988 Congressional
Amendments to the FCPA45 and contained in a massive trade bill,46
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402(1)–(2) (1987).
38. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a) to -3(a).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i).
40. Sperber, supra note 1, at 692 & nn. 82–83. Private rights of action against FCPA
violators rely on the ―Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (―RICO‖).‖
FCPA Guide, supra note 2, at 1 (―An action might be brought under RICO by a competitor
who alleges that bribery led to the defendant winning a foreign contract.‖).
41. FCPA Guide, supra note 2, at 2.
42. Conry, supra note 12, at 1.
43. Don Lee, Doing Sticky Business in China; A Pasadena Firm Gets Caught up in a
Market Rife with Corruption, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at 1.
44. Sperber, supra note 1 at 692 & n. 82; FCPA Guide, supra note 2, at 3. (―[A]n action
might be brought under RICO by a competitor who alleges that bribery led to the defendant
winning a foreign contract.‖).
45. See Julia Christine Bliss & Gregory J. Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1988: Clarification or Evisceration, 20 LAW & POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 441, 444, 449 (1988).
46. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5003(a),
(c), 102 Stat. 1107, 1417, 1422 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). The impetus for the 1998 amendments was a concern that the FCPA hindered
American businesses in the international market. United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681,
684 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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this procedure allows any ―issuer‖ or ―domestic concern‖ facing
potential liability under the FCPA ―to obtain an opinion of the
Attorney General as to whether certain specified, prospective—not
hypothetical—conduct conforms with the Department‘s present
enforcement policy.‖47 The applicable regulations then provide that
the Attorney General‘s office will return an opinion on the situation
within 30 days after receiving a completed request.48 If the Attorney
General approves of the requestor‘s conduct, the requestor receives a
―rebuttable presumption‖ that the conduct was legal in any future
enforcement action.49
Few cases exist interpreting the elements of the FCPA and
commentators consider much of the statute subject to varying
interpretations.50 Some even suggest that the FCPA‘s ambiguity may
rise to the level of unconstitutionality,51 but the statutory language
likely does not reach the required level of vagueness.52 The statute‘s
ambiguity does, however, create a great deal of uncertainty for those
subject to its provisions. As a result of the statute‘s uncertain breadth,
companies and business leaders subject to the FCPA often choose to
pay a fine rather than litigate their charges and risk receiving an
unfavorable judgment, which could have more costly and
unpredictable effects on a company‘s good will.53 Due to the
frequency with which FCPA violations proceed to settlement, and the
dearth of litigation, the law of international bribery lacks the level of
appellate review required to act as a check on prosecutorial
aggression.

47. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2010).
48. Id. § 80.8.
49. Id. § 80.10.
50. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 1250; Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance,
17 CURRENTS INT‘L TRADE L. J. 14, 16 (2008) (noting the many ambiguous terms in the
FCPA and its failure to provide definitions); Conry, supra note 12, at 15 (commenting on the
―potential pitfalls faced . . . when dealing with foreign officials‖).
51. Kay, 513 F.3d at 440 (―Defendants argue that the statute failed to give fair notice that
their conduct was illegal and that proceeding to trial with the late arriving clarification of the
Act violated their due process rights.‖); United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (―[T]he portion of the indictment charging [the defendant] with conspiracy
to violate the FCPA contravenes the constitutional fair notice requirement.‖).
52. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1267 (―Despite the available ‗vagueness‘ arguments in FCPA
cases, it would be difficult for a defendant to convince a court applying the Lanier test that
the term ‗instrumentality thereof‘ is so vague and ambiguous that it is not reasonably clear
enough for a common individual to understand its meaning‖).
53. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1248.
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As companies subject to the FCPA try to establish compliance
with the statute to avoid the significant penalties imposed,54 the
ambiguity in the statute causes great difficulty for business leaders
and those advising them. While the Opinion Procedure allows
resolution of particularly confusing questions, it remains cumbersome
and time consuming.55 Fast-paced commercial enterprises in the
midst of a business transaction may not be able to afford the thirtyday waiting period expected for the return of a DOJ opinion.
Moreover, in the absence of significant case law, commentators have
been forced to assemble insights into the meaning of key FCPA terms
from limited sources, including the relevant Opinion Procedure
releases and public statements by officials at the DOJ.56
A few courts have had opportunities to clarify the terms of the
FCPA. In United States v. Bodmer, the government alleged that the
defendant, Hans Bodmer, acted as the agent of two Delaware
businesses when he gave bribes to Azerbaijani officials in order to
secure shares in the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic
(SOCAR).57 Bodmer argued that prior to the 1998 amendments to the
FCPA, foreign nationals were not subject to criminal penalties for
violations of the Act. He claimed that because his conduct had
occurred prior to those amendments, the rule of lenity mandated the
dismissal of the FCPA charges against him.58 Over the government‘s
argument that the FCPA had always applied to ―non-resident foreign
nationals who had ‗minimum contacts‘ with the United States,‖59 the
court went on to review the legislative history leading up the 1998
amendment. The Bodmer court found that, ―after consideration of the
statutory language, legislative history, and judicial interpretations of
the FCPA, the jurisdictional scope of the statute‘s criminal penalties
[was] still unclear.‖60 Applying the rule of lenity, the court dismissed

54. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010), 3–4
(statement of Michael Volkov, Esq., Partner, Mayer Brown LLP) [hereinafter Volkov].
55. The opinion procedure allows for a requestor to receive a DOJ interpretation of a
hypothetical situation within 30 days of a completed request, which could result in a lengthy
wait from the time of the requestor‘s initial inquiry. See 28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2010).
56. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1251–55.
57. United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 178–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
58. Id. at 181. A rule of statutory construction, the rule of lenity requires that an
ambiguous criminal statute be construed in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., United States v.
Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 264 (2000).
59. Id. at 182.
60. Id. at 187.
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the FCPA charges against Bodmer for lack of fair warning.61
Although the court upheld the defendant‘s fair warning argument,
that argument relied on retroactive application of the statute, rather
than on the FCPA‘s ambiguity.62
In a related case, United States v. Kozeny, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York considered whether a payment
made was ―lawful under the written laws and regulations‖ of the
receiving nation.63 If so, this would have provided the defendant an
affirmative defense to an act otherwise prohibited under the FCPA.64
The defendant, Frederic Bourke, Jr., a former client of Hans Bodmer,
was charged with violation of the FCPA for his participation in the
same scheme involving shares of SOCAR. Bourke argued that
Azerbaijani criminal law permitted his payments.65 The court found
that although Azerbaijani law ―relieved‖ the defendant of ―criminal
responsibility,‖ the FCPA focuses on the ―payment, not the payer,‖
and the payment remained unlawful.66 Therefore, the initial payment
was still illegal.67 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that the
possibility of extortion could allow Bourke to argue that he ―lacked
the requisite corrupt intent to make a bribe‖ that violates the FCPA.68
In United States v. Kay, the defendant, David Kay, was charged
with FCPA violations including payments made to reduce customs
duties and taxes on rice exports to Haiti.69 In defense, Kay argued
that the FCPA ―failed to give fair notice that [his] conduct was

61. Id. at 189, 192–93.
62. Id.
63. 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
64. See supra Part II.B.
65. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 537. This argument was based on the fact that the
payments were the product of extortion, and Bourke reported them to the President of
Azerbaijan. Id.
66. Id. at 539. The court in Kozeny treated the question of foreign law as a question of
law per Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 538. Rule 26.1 requires
a ―party intending to raise an issue of foreign law‖ to ―provide the court and all parties with
reasonable written notice.‖ FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1. That rule also allows the court to ―consider
any relevant material or source—including testimony—without regard to the Federal Rules
of Evidence.‖ Id.
67. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
68. Id. at 540. At trial, the court instructed the jury on the required corrupt intent for an
FCPA violation, defining that intent as ―knowledge of and the intention to further its
objective of corruptly and willfully bribing foreign officials.‖ United States v. Kozeny, 664
F. Supp. 2d 369, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). That jury found Mr. Bourke guilty, and his Rule 29
motion for acquittal or alternatively a new trial under Rule 33 was denied. Id. at 372, 397.
69. 513 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 513 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2007).
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illegal.‖70 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
agreed and granted Kay‘s motion to dismiss on these grounds,
holding that the FCPA‘s prohibition of payments to ―obtain or retain
business‖ did not include payments made to reduce customs duties
and taxes.71 On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit refuted Kay‘s fair
notice argument, finding that the statute is not ―so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.‖72 The Fifth Circuit interpreted the FCPA‘s
business nexus requirement literally and broadly, holding that the
FCPA prohibited the defendant‘s conduct, provided it was intended
to ―assist in obtaining or retaining business.‖73 On remand, the
district court declined Kay‘s motion to dismiss for lack of fair
warning,74 and following a second appeal the Fifth Circuit denied
Kay‘s argument again.75 The court found that its earlier decision had
not expanded the scope of the FCPA and affirmed the conviction.76
Despite refuting the defendant‘s vagueness arguments, the Fifth
Circuit acknowledged in Kay that significant ambiguity does exist in
the FCPA‘s business nexus element.77 The court found it necessary to
conduct a lengthy statutory analysis to determine the meaning of
―obtaining or retaining business,‖78 and the case also required
multiple appeals to reach a conclusion. Although the court found no
lack of fair warning,79 the lengthy judicial process in Kay exemplifies
how greater clarity in the FCPA would benefit both companies
attempting to comply with its provisions and courts seeking greater
judicial economy.

70. Id. at 440.
71. United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686–87 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
72. Kay, 513 F.3d at 441 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)). The
court in Kay applied all four tests of fair notice: (1) ―vagueness of the statute‘s language‖;
(2) ―court‘s retroactive enlargement of the scope of a statute‖; (3) ―the rule of lenity‖; and
(3) the ―touchstone principle.‖ The FCPA satisfied none of these tests. Id. at 446.
73. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 761 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit conducted
a lengthy statutory analysis of the FCPA, focusing particularly on the ―business nexus‖
element of the statute. Id. at 741–55.
74. Kay, 513 F.3d at 440.
75. Id. at 461.
76. Id.
77. Kay, 359 F.3d at 744.
78. Id. at 746 (―As the statutory language itself is amenable to more than one reasonable
interpretation, it is ambiguous as a matter of law. We turn therefore to legislative history in
our effort to ascertain Congress‘s true intentions.‖). See also id. at 738.
79. Kay, 513 F.3d at 446.
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Many other ambiguities in the FCPA have not yet received any
clarification from the courts. Interpretation of these elements is left to
the speculative judgments of attorneys and the Opinion Procedure
process.80 First, a significant amount of uncertainty exists regarding
who qualifies as a foreign official to whom payments are
prohibited.81 The FCPA defines a foreign official as ―any officer or
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency or
instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization,‖ or
anyone ―acting in an official capacity‖ for one of those same
bodies.82 This definition clearly includes elected or appointed
government officials. But the public and private sectors often blend,
and many national governments own shares in various commercial
enterprises.83 In those circumstances, the FCPA‘s definition of a
foreign official remains open for speculation as to what constitutes an
―instrumentality‖ of a foreign government.
Second, the ―grease payments‖ exception for ―routine
governmental actions‖ also results in confusion for those subject to
the FCPA.84 While the statute provides some concrete examples of
governmental actions for which one may permissibly exchange
money,85 such as obtaining permits, it concludes with an allowance
for payments to procure other ―actions of a similar nature.‖86 This
broad statement prompts the question of why a payment to a foreign
official to secure a permit would be permitted, but a standardized
payment to secure efficient customs treatment (as in Kay) would not
be ―of a similar nature.‖87 Furthermore, the question remains whether
permissible payments to secure ―routine‖ governmental actions may
vary among nations and cultures along with their routines.
Third, uncertainty exists regarding the content of the ―reasonable
and bona fide expenditure‖ exception. The enforcement authorities
have interpreted this exception very narrowly.88 Excessive expenses
not directly tied to conduct business or which appear excessive in
80. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1251–55.
81. See infra Part II.D.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2006).
83. Conry, supra note 12, at 3 (noting how the enforcement authorities‘ interpretation of
the foreign official element of the FCPA may lead to ―unexpected liability‖).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2006).
85. Id. § 78dd-1(b). See supra note 29 for a list of permissible ―routine governmental
actions.‖
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A) (2006).
87. Compare id. with United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (S. D. Tex. 2002).
88. Conry, supra note 12, at 24.
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light of the circumstances may result in million dollar fines for
violators.89 As with many of the statutory terms, however, there
remains a significant gap between the interpretation of the
enforcement authorities and the actual language of the statute,
considering the breadth of potential interpretations by courts and
laypersons.
B. THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977, and for many years the
United States stood alone in prohibiting bribery of foreign officials.90
This unilateral prohibition on bribery placed U.S. companies at a
disadvantage in global markets.91 In response to the complaints of
U.S. business leaders, the government began a campaign to persuade
other nations of the necessity of preventing international bribery.92
While most nations traditionally prohibited bribery of their own
officials, multinational conventions regulating cross-border bribery
began to spring up only recently, aided by the urgings of Congress
and the Executive Branch.93 The most prominent of these
conventions is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials
in International Business Transactions, which resulted from the
realization that bribery had become ―a widespread phenomenon in
international business transactions.‖94 Signed in 1997 and entered
into force in 1999, current signatories include 34 OECD member
countries and four countries that are not OECD members.95
89. Id. at 19.
90. Sperber, supra note 1, at 679-80.
91. President‘s Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 1 PUB. PAPERS
664 (May 1, 1998) [hereinafter President‘s Message].
92. Id.
93. See Brown, supra note 1, at 76 (noting the recent vintage of multinational
conventions).
94. OECD Convention, supra note 14, pmbl. See also United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003) (listing
―multilateral instruments to prevent and combat corruption‖).
95. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2057484_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2011); OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,
en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). The four nonmember countries are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, and South Africa. Id. The United States
ratified the Convention without reservations, and Congress acted to amend the FCPA
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The Convention requires all parties to:
take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it
is a criminal offence under its law for any person
intentionally to offer, promise or give any pecuniary or
other advantage . . . to a foreign public official . . . in order
to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in
the conduct of international business.96
Article 1 goes on to define the term ―foreign public official as ―any
person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office in a
foreign country,‖ as well as ―any person exercising a public function
for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public
enterprise.‖97
Many signatories to the Convention have enacted legislation to
implement the required prohibitions.98 While the Convention requires
only ―functional equivalence‖ amongst the laws of its signatories, it
also prohibits the use of derogations in ratification.99 Accordingly,
many nations‘ implementing legislation closely tracks the language
of the Convention. The experiences of Australia, Germany, Hungary,
and the United Kingdom are illustrative.
Australia‘s Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials) Act of 1999 defines all of the significant terms for
the offense of bribery of a foreign official. 100 The statute specifies
that one may not give a foreign official ―any benefit,‖ a term not
limited to tangible property. Importantly, and in great contrast to the
FCPA, the Australian statute goes into great detail regarding who
qualifies as a foreign public official.101 The statute draws a clear line
regarding employees of state owned enterprises. When a foreign
government holds more than fifty percent of the shares or voting
power, or the ability to appoint more than fifty percent of the
directors of a company, then one may not exchange money for
business with an employee of that company. The statute also

according to the OECD shortly thereafter. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 783, 753–55 (5th
Cir. 2004).
96. OECD Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(1).
97. Id. ¶ 4.
98. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, supra note 19.
99. OECD Convention, supra note 14, pmbl., para. 8.
100. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) div 70.1 (Austl.).
101. Id.
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prohibits payments to employees of companies whose directors are
clearly influenced by the foreign government.102
German implementing legislation follows the Convention very
closely. The German statute prohibits the giving of any advantage to
a foreign official in exchange for any advantage in an international
business transaction.103 The German definition of foreign official
focuses on government employees, including members of the
judiciary and the military.104 In close cases, the statute focuses on
whether the individual receiving the bribe exercises a ―public
function.‖105
Hungary was second to the United States with 27 individuals
sanctioned for bribery of foreign officials between 2000 and 2009,106
but significant skepticism remains concerning the scope and
application of the Hungarian statute.107 Peripheral nations like
Hungary will likely experience the most difficulty in obtaining
widespread governmental adherence to an anti-bribery regime. Both
Hungary‘s location in east-central Europe and its post-communist
identity make it prone to continuing concerns regarding corruption.108
Furthermore, Hungary‘s implementing legislation contains
considerable uncertainty regarding the ―quid pro quo‖ requirement,
which is similar to the FCPA‘s business nexus element.109 The
United States and other western nations must closely monitor the
actions of their own companies operating in Hungary and other
similar nations in order to ensure that the prohibitions of the
Convention achieve the parity they intended.

102. Id.
103. Gleichstellung von ausländischen mit inländischen Amtsträgern bei
Bestechungshandlungen [Act on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions], Sep. 10, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II [BGBL II],
art. 2, § 2, translated in Act on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/3/2377209.
pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
104. Id. art. 2, § 1.
105. Id.
106. Working Group on Bribery Data on Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention,
OECD, 3 (June 2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/15/45450341.pdf.
107. See Hungary: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997
Recommendations on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, OECD,
39–41 (May 6, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/34/34918600.pdf.
108. See id. at 6–7.
109. Id. at 39–40.
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The United Kingdom stands poised to join the United States as a
leader in combating international bribery. In April 2010, the U.K.
passed the Bribery Act of 2010 (Bribery Act).110 The Act prohibits
the giving of a bribe to a government official or an individual
exercising a ―public function‖ on behalf of a government to obtain or
retain business or a business advantage.111 In an expansion that far
exceeds the scope of the Convention, the Bribery Act also prohibits
the giving of a financial advantage to any person in exchange for the
―improper‖ performance of a ―relevant activity.‖112 Jurisdiction is
extended only to acts which take place in the territory of the U.K.,113
in accordance with the Convention‘s mandate for territorial
jurisdiction.114 But the Bribery Act prohibits the same ―grease‖
payments for which the FCPA provides an exception,115 and the Act
only provides affirmative defenses for certain situations relating to
the national defense.116 While it appears that the U.K. statute may
vault the nation into the lead role for international bribery prevention,
its enforcement by U.K. authorities will ultimately decide the weight
that international business interests ought to place on it.117
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FCPA AND THE CONVENTION
A.

Material Differences Between the FCPA and the Convention

The Convention differs from the FCPA in two material ways.
First, they diverge regarding the proscribed benefits following a
payment to a foreign official. Second, the two documents define the
term foreign official differently.
The Convention prohibits bribing a foreign official ―in order to
obtain or retain business or other improper advantage.‖118 The
Convention thus captures a very broad range of behavior, including
bribes to obtain new contracts, as well as those intended to reduce
110. Press Release, Ministry of Justice, Bribery Act Implementation (July 20, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/newsrelease200710a.htm.
111. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1 (Eng.).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 12.
114. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
115. See § 4.
116. Id. § 12.
117. Prior the enactment of the Bribery Act, the U.K. sanctioned only one individual
between 2000 and 2009. See Working Group on Bribery Data on Enforcement of the AntiBribery Convention, supra note 103, at 4 tbl.
118. OECD Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(1).
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expenses or gain favorable treatment in the country whose official
receives the bribe. The FCPA, on the other hand, utilizes a more
complex ―business nexus element‖ to define the proscribed
behavior.119
The initial version of the FCPA left out any language referring to
an ―improper advantage,‖ but after Congress ratified the Convention,
it added that language in amendments to the FCPA.120 Rather than
including the prohibition of an ―improper advantage‖ along with
other ―obtained business‖, however, Congress chose to place it in
front of the business nexus requirement, so that the FCPA prohibits
bribes to a foreign official in order to secure an ―improper advantage‖
which assists the briber in ―obtaining or retaining business.‖121
Therefore, while ―obtaining or retaining business‖ clearly refers to
the awarding of contracts, the extent to which the FCPA prohibits the
acquisition of other favorable treatment is unclear. The ―grease
payments‖ exception further confuses the issue, by creating a list of
specific exceptions along with an undefined catch-all phrase at the
end.122
In United States v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the FCPA‘s
―business nexus requirement‖ to include bribes made for the purposes
of favorable tax and customs treatment.123 The Kay court extensively
reviewed the legislative history of the FCPA, concluding that,
―Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments
intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining
or retaining business for some person.‖124 While the court observed
that there might be a gap between what the FCPA and the Convention
each prohibit, it found that the Convention clearly prohibited the
payments in question.125 The fact that Congress ratified the
119. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 754 (5th Cir. 2004). The FCPA‘s business
nexus element seems to contain an extra step, prohibiting payments made ―in order to assist
[the briber] in obtaining or retaining business.‖ 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (2006).
120. Kay, 359 F.3d at 754.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (2006).
122. See supra Part I.A.
123. Kay, 359 F.3d at 755.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 754. The court explained itself in a footnote:
We recognize that there may be some variation in scope between the
Convention and the FCPA. The FCPA prohibits payments inducing official
action that ‗assists . . . in obtaining or retaining business‘; the Convention
prohibits payments that induce official action ‗to obtain or retain business or
other improper advantage in the conduct of international business.‘ Potential
variation exists because it is unclear whether the Convention‘s ‗other improper
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Convention ―without any reservation, understandings, or alterations‖
furthered the Kay court‘s willingness to interpret the FCPA broadly,
prohibiting the defendants‘ payments to foreign officials.126 While
the Kay court willingly closed the gap between the FCPA‘s business
nexus requirement and the proscribed benefits under the Convention,
that decision only controls the Fifth Circuit, and uncertainty remains
because of the language of the FCPA and the potential for varying
interpretations by other courts.
The different definitions of a foreign official contribute to further
uncertainty for those subject to the FCPA. The Convention defines a
foreign public official as any official of a foreign government as well
as ―any person exercising a public function for a foreign country,
including for a public agency or public enterprise.‖127 The FCPA,
however, defines a ―foreign official‖ as ―any officer or employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality
thereof, or of a public international organization,‖ or anyone ―acting
in an official capacity‖ for one of those same bodies. Clearly both
statutes prohibit bribes to all elected and high level appointed
officials, but uncertainty exists regarding employees of state-owned
agencies, enterprises, or instrumentalities. The OECD defines a
―public enterprise‖ as one ―in which the government holds a majority
stake,‖ or ―over which the government may exercise a dominant
influence either directly or indirectly.‖128 The FCPA, on the other
hand, provides no definition of what constitutes an instrumentality of
a foreign government. While the OECD prohibits payments to
officials or those exercising a public function, the FCPA‘s prohibition
of payments to ―any officer or employee‖ of any government or
instrumentality appears to capture a broader range of behavior. In
sum, the OECD contains a narrower, clearer standard. By setting a
broader, more unclear standard, the United States increases
uncertainty and impedes American commercial success.
This lack of guidance poses an unnecessary problem as
companies attempt to remain compliant in the face of increased
FCPA enforcement. A large number of foreign states have varying
degrees of ownership and control of business entities, including those
advantage in the conduct of international business‘ language requires a business
nexus to the same extent as does the FCPA.
Id. at 755 n.68 (omissions in original).
126. Id. at 755 & n.68.
127. OECD Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(4).
128. Corruption: A Glossary of International Criminal Standards, OECD, 29 (2007),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/9/39532693.pdf.
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within their borders and those in other nations.129 Successful business
with these companies often calls for behavior with uncertain
implications under the FCPA. This uncertainty is unnecessary,
however, as Congress has already ratified the Convention, which
provides clear guidance on prohibited activities. Therefore, by
interpreting all ambiguities in the FCPA in accordance with U.S.
obligations under the Convention, the United States could continue to
lead the world in preventing bribery in international business, while
continuing to honor its obligations under international law.
B.

The Effect of the Convention on the FCPA

Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states that ―all treaties
made . . . under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the land.‖130 In the exercise of this authority,
Congress encouraged the creation of the Convention,131 ratified it,
and passed legislation to amend the FCPA in accordance with its
obligations thereunder.132 Both international law and Supreme Court
jurisprudence abound with support for the binding effect of treaties
duly ratified.133 Consequently, the Convention is the ―supreme law of
the land.‖134 Despite its support for the Convention, however,
Congress failed to provide definitions under the FCPA that measure
up to those provided in the Convention.135 Insofar as the FCPA
prohibits less conduct than the Convention, the United States violates
its obligations under domestic and international law. Therefore,
Congress must amend the statute to give full credit to the Convention.
Alternatively, Courts may rectify that failing through consistent

129. Conry, supra note 12, at 5.
130. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
131. See infra Part I.E.
132. Sperber, supra note 1, at 680.
133. Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the United States
has signed (but not ratified), states that a treaty applies throughout the territory of all
signatories. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 29, May 23, 1969, 1115
U.N.T.S. 331 (―Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.‖); Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP‘T STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/
70139.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (noting that ―U.S. Senate has not given its advice or
consent‖ to the Vienna Convention). See also Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683 (1887)
(―[T]reaties made by the United States and in force are part of the supreme law of the land,
and that they are as binding within the territorial limits of the states as they are elsewhere
throughout the dominion of the United States.‖).
134. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
135. See supra Part I.D.
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interpretation of the FCPA in line with the prohibitions of the
Convention.
The Convention‘s prohibition of bribery likely applies to the
United States as a rule of customary international law as well. ―A rule
of international law is one that has been accepted . . . by the
international community of states by international agreement.‖136
When an international agreement is ―intended for adherence by states
generally‖ and is ―in fact widely accepted,‖ it may ―lead to the
creation of customary international law.‖137 The Convention has been
signed by 38 countries. Furthermore, the Convention is clearly
―intended for adherence by states generally,‖ because ―all countries
share a responsibility to combat bribery in international business
transactions.‖138 The mere creation of the Convention was based on
international recognition that bribery is unacceptable, and its
prevention in international business requires adherence by all states.
Therefore, the Convention may have risen to the level of customary
international law, further solidifying U.S. obligations to assure
compliance with the Convention through prohibition of all activity
prohibited by the Convention.
Furthermore, traditional rules of treaty interpretation support a
reading of the FCPA that is consistent with the Convention. In
interpreting a statute within the bounds of international law, U.S.
courts have recognized the long-standing principle that ―an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.‖139 The Fifth Circuit
followed this principle by avoiding a conflict of laws when it read the
FCPA‘s ―business nexus element‖ in conformity with the
Convention.140 This interpretation should provide the standard for
other courts‘ interpretations of the business nexus element, as well as
any other element of the FCPA that diverges from the Convention.
In addition to ensuring that no elements of the FCPA prohibit
less activity than under the Convention, the United States should
ensure that the FCPA does not prohibit any more activity than the
Convention. Prosecutions of FCPA violations have reached all time

136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(1)(b) (1987).
137. Id. §102(3).
138. OECD Convention, supra note 14, pmbl., para. 2.
139. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
140. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 n.68 (5th Cir. 2004).
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highs in recent years.141 These prosecutions have resulted in massive
liability on the part of many U.S. companies, as well as their officers,
directors, and employees.142 While no justification exists for bribery,
comity concerns abound with regard to prosecutions of international
businesses and foreign nationals, and parity requires equal standards
for all entities and individuals subject to international bribery laws.143
Prior to the creation of the Convention, both Congress and the
Executive Branch had an acute awareness for the disadvantages
suffered by U.S. businesses under the unilateral prohibitions of the
FCPA.144 In response to these disadvantages, Congress urged the
drafting of the Convention in order to achieve the parity desired in
commerce.145 Shortly after ratification of the Convention, Congress
enacted implementing legislation to achieve the goals of the
Convention by amending the FCPA.146 Because a treaty, particularly
one with implementing legislation, becomes the ―supreme law of the
land,‖ the amended FCPA should be interpreted in accordance with
the intentions of Congress and the Executive branch when the
Convention was ratified in 1998. Currently parts of the FCPA, as
enforced by the DOJ, capture more than was intended by Congress,
and achieve the opposite result. In order to comply with the intentions
of Congress, which focused on promoting parity for U.S. businesses,
the DOJ must temper its enforcement of the FCPA, and courts must
interpret the statute with regards to Congress‘ intention to alleviate
the disadvantages to U.S. businesses by such vigorous enforcement.
Policy reasons also call for more moderate prosecution under the
FCPA. When the enforcement agencies relentlessly prosecute U.S.
companies for FCPA violations, they risk injuring the
competitiveness of those companies in the global marketplace.
Certain countries in the world operate on a ―pay to play‖ basis.147
Prohibiting U.S. companies from competing in ―pay to play‖ nations

141. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
142. Jeffrey Clark et al., Anti-Corruption, 44 INT‘L LAW. 451, 451–63 (2010) (noting 11
prosecutions against companies, and 17 prosecutions against individuals for violations of the
FCPA).
143. While these concerns remain valid for all state parties to the Convention, Article 5 of
the Convention does prohibit consideration of the ―national economic interest,‖ or the
―potential effect upon relations with another State.‖ OECD Convention, supra note 14, art. 5.
144. See supra President‘s Message note 88; S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2 (1998).
145. S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2.
146. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302.
147. E.g., O‘Grady, supra note 13 (regarding Haiti).
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can injure their economies as well, and often ―pay to play‖ nations
are those in the developing world. Fear of prosecution under the
FCPA, due to zealous enforcement coupled with ambiguous statutory
provisions, may stifle investment in the developing world, reducing
the availability of the capital necessary for economic growth.148
Because the provisions of the Convention are already valid in the
United States, reliance on the Convention would suffice to combat
bribery, as well as to relieve some of the disadvantages to U.S.
businesses and the burgeoning economies of ―pay to play‖ nations.
In addition to aligning the FCPA with the Convention, U.S.
legislators, enforcement authorities, and courts could help domestic
companies and foreign development by changing their approach to
the FCPA. They could apply the exceptions for grease payments and
routine governmental actions with more fidelity to the text of the
FCPA, especially for payments in developing nations that need
economic stimulus. Congress enacted the FCPA to restore confidence
in the integrity and morality of the American market.149 Doing
business in ―pay to play‖ markets such as Haiti often requires
payments that would currently result in substantial fines and jail time
under the FCPA. Allowing these payments would not erode
confidence in the American market. By allowing more payments to
facilitate business, the United States could permit companies to pay
foreign officials in order to reduce customs and tax obligations,
especially in nations where it is customary to do so. Furthermore,
U.S. enforcement agencies could temper their prosecution of the
FCPA while companies scramble to add compliance programs and
internalize the prohibitions of the FCPA.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. role in combating bribery in international business is
commendable, and the end of bribery remains a necessary goal for

148. Id. O‘Grady explains:
An American entrepreneur who does business in the Caribbean recently
explained the Haitian landscape to me this way: ―We did not bother with Haiti
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act precludes legitimate U.S. entities from
entering the Haitian market. Haiti is pure pay to play. The benefit of
competitive submarine cables would be transformative for the Haitians. Instead,
they were stuck with Clinton cronies taxing the poor.‖ Id.
149. H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4–5 (1977), (noting that bribery is ―unethical,‖ and
―counter to the moral expectations and values of the American public,‖ which in turn
―erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market system‖).
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world markets.150 But businesses should operate on a level playing
field, with success depending on merit rather than who can afford to
pay the largest bribes.151
U.S. enforcement authorities have increased FCPA prosecutions
to unparalleled highs.152 Paired with ambiguity in statutory
construction, this unwavering enforcement stifles U.S. companies in
their competition for business abroad and prevents the receipt of U.S.
investment in many developing nations.153 First, courts and
legislators should ensure that the FCPA prohibitions match those of
the Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. 154 As other
nations follow, this statutory convergence will increase parity in
international business while ensuring U.S. compliance with treaty
obligations.155 International cooperation on the interpretation of the
Convention will resolve a great deal of ambiguity in both the FCPA
and the implementing legislation of other nations.156 Second, the SEC
and DOJ should reduce the penalties sought and match their
enforcement of the FCPA with education regarding its terms. While
the FCPA has been very lucrative for the DOJ, those same funds that
fill government coffers have left the accounts of some of the world‘s
largest employers, reducing needed global capital and hampering
development.
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151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See supra Part I.
Id.
See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.B.
Id.
Id.

